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Abstract 
A previous analysis of the impact of formal institutions on the knowledge economy of 22 Middle-
Eastern and Sub-Sahara African countries during the 1996-2010 time period concluded that formal 
institutions were necessary, but inadequate, determinants of the knowledge economy. To extend 
that study, this paper claims that globalization induces peace and stability, which affects 
governance and through governance the knowledge economy. The claim addresses one weakness 
of previous research that did not consider the effects on the knowledge economy of globalization. 
We model the proposition as a three-stage process in four hypotheses, and estimate each 
hypothesis using robust estimators that are capable of dealing with the usual statistical problems 
without sacrificing economic relevance and significance. The results indicate that globalization 
has varying effects on peace and stability, and peace and stability affect governance differently 
depending on what kind of globalization induces it. For instance, the effects on governance 
induced by globalization defined as trade are stronger than those resulting from globalization 
taken to be foreign direct investment. Hence, we conclude that foreign direct investment is not a 
powerful mechanism for stimulating and sustaining the knowledge economy in our sample of 
countries. However, since globalization-induced peace and stability have both positive and 
negative effects on governance simultaneously, we also conclude that while the prospect for 
knowledge economy in African countries is dim, it is still realistic and attainable as long as these 
countries continue to engage in the kind of globalization that does indeed induce peace and 
stability. We further conclude that there is a need for a sharper focus on economic and institutional 
governance than on general governance as one possible extension of this paper.  
JEL Classification: I20; I28; K42; O10; O55 
Keywords:  Globalisation; Peace and Stability; Governance; Knowledge Economy
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 Throughout this paper we use the terms “peace,” “stability,” and “peace and stability” interchangeably to mean 
“political stability”, or “No unmanageable violence.” In interactive interpretation, “peaceful stability” is the same 
thing as “stable peace”. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper extends Andres, Asongu, and Amavilah’s (2013) analysis of the impact of formal 
institutions through the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on the knowledge 
economy (KE) of 22 Middle East and North African (MENA) and Sub-Sahara African countries 
of the 1996-2010 time period. The results of that study suggested that IPRs were necessary, but 
inadequate, determinants of the performance of the KE of the group of countries sampled, and that 
other factors were more likely responsible for observed outcomes. The current extension claims 
that globalization induces peace and stability, which affects governance and through governance 
the performance of KEs. The claim is important because it permits us to connect key concepts in 
economic development in testable ways, and to close an existing information gap in this area. 
Both the analytical model we develop and the outcomes of its implementation serve policy and 
further research in Sub-Saharan African countries where the information gap is presently deepest 
and widest as far as we can assess. 
 We put forward four testable hypotheses, employ the principal component analysis to 
minimize the concern for information redundancy, and finally apply an innovative three-stage 
regression technique to the hypotheses. In the first stage we associate political peace and stability 
(lack of violence) with trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) as measures of openness. In the 
second stage, stability influences three indicators of governance: general governance (GG), 
economic governance (EG), and institutional governance (IG). Finally, we relate stability and 
governance to various measures of KE such as education (Educatex), information and 
communication technologies (ICTex), innovation (Innovex), and economic incentives (Creditex). 
Subsequent analysis of the four hypotheses finds considerably measurable positive and negative 
correlations indicators of peace and stability and those of KE by way of governance. For instance, 
the first hypothesis is that globalization-induced stability affects governance, which influences KE 
in terms of education. The results reveal that in increasing order of relevance and significance, the 
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effects (3.94) of trade-induced stability on institutional governance are weakest, whereas trade-
induced stability has the strongest impacts (26.66) on economic governance. The positive signs 
found are consistent with both intuition and the predictions of economic theory.  
 The second hypothesis holds that, globalization-induced stability affects governance which 
influences KE represented by ICT. The estimates that are significant have the expected signs, and 
are consistent with both commonsense and what economic theory predicts a priori. In this case the 
effects on institutional governance of the stability resulting from financial openness are strongest 
and positive (78.64) but they are lowest at 25.68 with respect economic governance. The impact 
on general governance of peace and stability resulting from financial openness fall in-between 
(27.12). Similarly, the third, hypothesis states that globalization-induced stability affects 
governance, which influences KE measured as economic incentives. In this particular case the 
significant estimates have mixed signs -- both negative and positive. However, while there are 
negative effects from FDI-related estimates, the impacts are positive for globalization-oriented 
estimates. 
 The fourth, and final, KE hypothesis suggests that globalization-induced stability affects 
governance, which influences KE in terms of innovation (Table 11). Here the effects range from 
the low of -14.26 to the high of 23.95. Here, too, while trade related effects are positive, 
globalization oriented estimates are negative. The logical inference is that, relative to the effects of 
FDI-induced stability on governance, the effects of trade-related stability on governance have a 
more positive weight on innovation even though both are generally representations of 
globalization-induced stability. In other words, for this group of countries over this study period 
trade openness is a more effective mechanism for innovation than FDI openness.   
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This study steers clear of current discourses on KE
2
 but nonetheless extends a growing 
stream of studies on  achieving development  with lessons from other countries with successful 
KE records  (Wa Gĩthĩnji & Adesida, 2011; Fosu, 2013a; Nyarko, 2013a; Strulik et al., 2013; Zhu 
& Pearson, 2013; Gerritsen et al., 2013; Kocourek &  Simanova, 2013;  Tchamyou, 2014)
3
. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section scans existing literature to highlight key 
relationships among globalization, peace and stability, governance, and the aspects of the KE. The 
section after that outlines very briefly the theoretical structure upon which the model 
implementation is founded. Empirical results and their implications for policy and further research 
are the subjects of the fifth section of the paper, while the sixth section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature 
The literature on each of the concepts of interest here is huge to even attempt to review, let alone 
do so coherently. In what follows we pair the concepts to stress specific relationships between 
them and to set the stage for modeling and estimating their interrelationships. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 To the best of our knowledge (Tchamyou, 2014), the bulk of the current KE literature focuses on, inter alia:  broad 
discussions of the phenomenon (Rooney, 2005; Lin, 2006; Anyanwu, 2012); information & communication 
technologies (Butcher, 2011);  education (Amavilah, 2009a; Ford, 2007; Weber, 2011; Wantchekon et al., 2014); 
institutional regime & economic incentives (Letiche, 2006; Cogburn, 2003; Andrés & Asongu, 2013); intellectual 
capital & economic development (Wagiciengo & Belal, 2012; Preece, 2013); innovation (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & 
Sampath, 2007; Carisle et al., 2013); research & development ( Sumberg, 2005; German & Stroud, 2007); indigenous 
knowledge systems (Lwoga et al., 2010; Raseroka, 2008); KE in the transformation of space (Moodley, 2003; 
Maswera et al., 2008);  intellectual property rights (Lor & Britz, 2005; Zerbe, 2005; Andrés & Asongu, 2013; 
Myburgh, 2011; Andrés et al., 2014);  and    spatiality in the production of knowledge (Bidwell et al., 2011; Neimark, 
2012) . 
3
 From past experiences (Fosu, 2010, 2012, 2013a) has documented ‘lessons and strategies on achieving development 
success’. These lessons are derived from: the emerging Asian giants of China & India (Yao, 2013; Singh, 2013; 
Santos-Paulino, 2013); East Asia & the Pacific Jomo & Wee, 2013; (Lee, 2013;  Warr, 2013; Khan, 2013; Thoburn, 
2013); sub-Saharan Africa (Lundahl & Petersson, 2013; Robinson, 2013; Subramanian, 2013;  Naudé, 2013; Fosu, 
2013b); Latin America & the Caribbean  (Solimano, 2013; De Mello, 2013; Trejos, 2013; Cardoso, 2013; Pozo et al., 
2013) and; North Africa  & the Middle East (Drine, 2013; Looney, 2013; Nyarko, 2013b; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2013). 
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2.1 Globalization, and Peace and Stability 
The intuition of the proposition that globalization induces peace and stability, and thereby 
influences governance has been documented by Bonaglia, et. al (2001), Lalountas, et al (2011), 
and Asongu (2014). Bonaglia et al. (2001) found that globalization in terms of trade openness 
reduces corruption, which is an important aspect of governance. Lalountas et al. (2011) and 
Asongu (2014) have recently confirmed the positive role of globalization on governance both in 
developing nations and African countries. The findings make good sense; peace and stability 
between trading partners contribute to the positive role of trade openness on governance. 
Therefore it is valid to sustain that globalization induced peace and stability affects governance. 
 To the extent to which peace and stability means lack, or existence of manageable 
incidence, of violence, the link between peace and stability on the one hand and globalization on 
the other hand is apparent from another line of research. For instance, Dani Rodrik (1997) 
measures conflicts as latent frictions particular to any community relative to the institutional 
capability (quality) for managing such frictions. He represents globalization with external shocks 
transmitted as terms of trade through the mechanism of foreign trade. Rodrik’s results show that 
for the developing countries both external shocks (globalization) and latent frictions (conflicts) 
have negative effects on economic growth, the former because of the poor quality of institutions 
and the latter because of declining terms of trade, or  the so-called Singer-Prebisch hypothesis. 
 Messer and Cohen (2006) demonstrate this link between globalization and conflicts using 
crop prices. They argue that by opening up markets to external forces, globalization has caused 
crop export price to increase and to fluctuate unpredictably. Price increases and unpredictable 
fluctuations led to food insecurity and thereby induced conflicts. In a related vein Susan Olzak 
(2011) observed that globalization, especially economic and cultural globalization, are associated 
with more deaths from internal armed ethnic conflicts. Sociocultural globalization increases ethnic 
conflicts, but reduces non-ethnic conflicts. The implication of this observation is that globalization 
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stimulates competition for scarce resources intra- ethnic, but it creates new understanding that 
diffuses frictions inter-ethnic. These results make perfect sense, but only because historically 
terms of trade have harmed developing countries. If terms of trade were favorable for developing 
countries, it would have been just as reasonable to hypothesize that trade-induced peace and 
stability can be as good as bad for governance. 
 Moreover, if one possible side-effect of globalization is to diffuse inter-ethnic conflicts, 
then it is not unreasonable for us to argue that under conditions of peace and stability it is not so 
clear that all conflicts would affect governance and KE negatively. The latency Rodrik observes 
suggests not the absence of conflicts but the success of peace and stability in keeping violence at 
bay.
4
 Tidwell and Lerche (2011) support us in arguing that globalization and conflicts are complex 
and inter-active, such that their partial and joint effects on economic performance are ambiguous. 
Such an argument is not without merit as not all conflicts are violent (disputed elections had 
occurred even in peaceful and stable economies, compare Bush v. Gore in the USA), and not all 
violent conflicts have necessarily bad consequences (think of overthrowing Hitler’s Nazism). 
Moahi (2007) adds another perspective to this one. He describes a situation in which the spread of 
globalization and the growth of KE tend to lead to unbalanced power relations between developed 
and developing economies, and in the absence of appropriate IPRs, both globalization and 
conflicts harm indigenous knowledge and knowledge systems. Viewed slightly differently, the 
perspective suggests that globalization can lead to economic growth and yet harm the KE if it 
unbalances the relationship between governance and peace and stability. In such cases empirical 
studies are incorrect by invariably representing conflicts only with violent conflicts, even though it 
is understandable that the short-run impacts of violent conflicts are predictably large.  
                                                          
4
 We are simply point out the facts here; not passing judgment on the goodness or badness of those facts. Compared to 
today, Saddam Hussain’s Iraq was both latently violent and stable, and that “peace and stability” favor institutions of 
governance that supported the regime that was in power and through it whatever KE it was financing. 
8 
 
 We accept that there is clearly a link between globalization and conflicts, but we are not 
entirely convinced of its nature, leaving testable the hypothesis that globalization determines 
peace and stability. The one question we would not pursue here, however, is what determines 
globalization itself. Even so, we know that to some globalization is simply a general-purpose 
technology like the internet. For most people, though, globalization is driven by many variables 
among them: technological changes, such as changes in ICT which made the exchange of ideas 
faster and cheaper to spread than before. The combined effect of newer technologies and larger 
scale, including network effects, have reduced transport and transactions costs so that goods and 
services move faster and over longer distances than even a decade ago. The processes of 
deregulation of resource ownership mean that property owners, most generally multinational 
companies, can now operate freely in any locality. Resources are also more mobile today than 
they were even 30 years ago; consider capital movement and human migrations.  In addition, 
income remittances, freer foreign trade, location-specific labor costs and their implications for 
outsourcing and relocation of production facilities, concentration of entrepreneurial activity, and 
other instruments, all these influence globalization.
5
 Hence, it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
these representations of globalization affect peace and stability positively. 
2.2 Governance and Conflicts v. Governance and Peace and Stability 
Neo-liberal economists have tended to over-stress the negative relationship between governance 
and conflicts, representing it with variables like political instability and violence. The logic is that 
conflicts weaken the quality of institutions of governance. Weak institutions are then unable to 
manage latent frictions of the kind Dani Rodrik refers to, which in turn lead to even more severe 
conflicts.  While such arguments are not without merit, they are nonetheless static and linear. They 
are linear for ignoring the effects of globalization on peace and stability. They are not dynamic 
                                                          
5
 W.A. Lewis (1965) has long dubbed this phenomenon the “bunching together of investment,” and therefore 
economic activity. 
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because they fail to recognize the indirect effects through peace and stability of globalization on 
governance. In fact, it is not unreasonable to claim a direct link between globalization and 
governance as the brief literature below illustrates.  
2.3 Governance and Globalization 
Globalization affects governance indirectly through peace and stability by minimizing violent 
conflicts, but also directly. Culturally globalization spread new ideas, technologies, tools, 
attitudes, social networks, and these have direct effects on governance. There is some truth to the 
suggestion that the so-called Arab Spring has been a communications revolution that overthrew 
institutions of governance by Twitter, Facebook, and the like. Globalization allows for political 
integration. Many developing countries are sensitive to trade, remittance, FDI, aid, education, 
health, international law, diplomacy, all of which are aspects of globalization which individually 
and/or jointly influence governance. 
 Bonaglia, Braga de Macedo, and Bussolo (2001) built a simple, but informative model to 
show “how globalization improves governance.” The question the model asked was succinct: ‘Is 
there an effect of globalization on governance?’ The answer was a firm “yes” as the title of the 
paper implies. How did they come to that answer? Well, they specified variables that effect 
institutional change, and assessed whether or not such variables reduce corruption, measured by 
the International Credit Risk Guide as perceived corruption in government (cf. Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001).  They found that high levels of measures of globalization like 
openness correlated with low levels of corruption, although mineral exports and in some cases 
trade liberalization worked against governance.  In fact, there are forces of governance competing 
with those of conflict-regenerating climate change, but we intend to pursue that line of thought 
separately. 
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2.4 Globalization, Peace and Stability, Governance, and the KE 
The connection between KE and governance is both most obvious, and most difficult to measure 
due to the lack of specificity with which to represent KE. For some KE is an economic activity 
like GDP; for others it is a measure of well-being such as GDP per capita, GDP per worker, or 
some other representations like the human development index (HDI). M.H. Khan (2007) is 
probably correct that correlation between the economic activity and governance since 1960s has 
meant two mutually exclusive things. Liberal economists tend to think of governance as “market-
enhancing capabilities that reduce transaction costs and enable markets to work more efficiently, 
… [whereas for] … heterodox economists governance is the capacities to overcome entrenched 
market failures” (pp. 8-16).  In this case saying governance is important to economic growth 
means two different outcomes. Regarding the former, economic growth happen when markets are 
efficient even if output remains unchanged; for the latter governance promotes economic growth 
only if it enhances productivity, i.e., it raises the standard of living measured conservatively as per 
capita income. Khan finds a statistically strong effect of governance as market-enhancing 
capabilities on economic growth for a sample of developed and developing countries, but no effect 
at all for African countries.  An example of market-enhancing governance is evident from Bigsten 
and Durevall’s (2002) study which interchanges globalization and market integration so that 
global markets imply the ‘law of one price’ and deviations from that price are essentially taken as 
disrespecting markets, a punishable offense, they argue and offer Zimbabwe’s experience as 
example. However, it would seem then that governance as productivity-enhancing is a better 
model for African countries. It is also the mechanism S. Korea, Malaysia, and China used with 
stellar, and India and Latin America used with mixed, results. These outcomes suggest that the 
problem is in the implementation of productivity-enhancing governance (see Khan, p. 21, last 
paragraph). 
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 Further evidence of the effects of governance on economic growth for African countries is 
in Fayissa and Nsiah (2010). Here governance, measured by the six world governance indicators, 
implies good governance, and good governance goes hand-in-hand with good institutions as 
economic growth drivers. The authors conclude that “good governance has a positive and 
significant impact on growth, regardless of the proxy used for governance” (p.14), and that low-
income countries benefit more from good governance than high-income countries. This result may 
be reasonable because Kaufmann, Kraay, et. al. (2003, 2002a,b, 1999a,b) argue that good 
governance leads to economic growth, but in the case of “state capture”, economic growth does 
not lead back to further good institutions or good governance, which breaks the “virtuous circle” 
(cf. Khan, 2010). This result is also consistent with Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000) by 
which trade integrates, whereas politics disintegrates at the same time, so that performance 
depends on the net balance between ‘economic integration’ and ‘political disintegration.’ While 
reasonable, this conclusion is inconsistent with Qubria (2006), who, using the same indicators of 
governance, found that for Asian countries economic growth has been fastest in countries with 
low governance indicators. In other instances the inconsistency may be that measures of 
governance used are not exactly the same. Amavilah (2009b, 2009c, 2009d,) observes that the 
influence of governance on economic performance depends on how governance is measured. For 
example, using the six  world governance indicators and the governance indicators assembled 
recently for African countries by Mo Ibrahim Foundation, one finds that although governance has 
a positive effect on economic growth on average, specific measures of governance differ, often in 
opposite directions. By the six indicators the “rule of law” constrains, but it promotes growth 
according to the MO Ibrahim’s indicators.  Despite all of this it is clear that there is a relationship 
between governance and economic performance of KE. 
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 However, many also suspect a direct relationship between economic activity and 
globalization besides the indirect one through peace and stability (lack of manageable conflicts). 
Axel Dreher (2003) looked at 123 countries over the 1970-2000 period and determined that 
globalization led to economic growth, even as it did not reduce poverty and/or income inequality. 
Political globalization had no major effect, and information flows had minimal effects. Economic 
globalization had strong effects, but such effects were conditional on the nature of global relations 
between developed and developing countries.   
 Amavilah (2008, 2009d) compared the effects of globalization, governance, physical and 
human capital, and unexplained technical change on the economic performance of Sub-Saharan 
African countries. Economic performance varied with measures of globalization and governance, 
suggesting that both governance and globalization are good for economic growth. However, it 
turns out that it is social globalization rather than economic globalization that is most beneficial. 
Similarly, on average the quality of institutions are important to economic performance, but, when 
disaggregated, different measures of institutional quality have different effects on performance. 
Thus, Amavilah’s findings confirmed Dreher’s results. 
 Last, but not least, Goklany (2002) for instance globalization improved the well-being of 
nations because it reduced hunger, infant mortality, and child labor, and increased life-expectancy. 
Ming-Chang Tsai (2006) adds that while average and political globalization have improved the 
well-being of nations, social and economic globalization have had either negative or positive but 
insignificant effects. Using HDI as a measure of national well-being Amavilah (2009b, 2009c) 
discovered that social globalization is important to the well-being of nations, but not nearly as 
much as material well-being, represented as real GDP per capita. Thus, we claim that the proper 
channel is in which globalization affects peace and stability, which determines governance, and 
governance influences the KE. 
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3. Putting Humpy-Dumpy Back Together Again – A Brief Theoretical Framework 
 
As stated above, Andres, Asongu, and Amavilah (2013) studied the impact of formal institutions 
through the enforcement of IPRs on the KE of 22 MENA and Sub-Sahara African countries over 
the 1996-2010 time period. The results of that study suggested that IPRs were necessary, but 
inadequate, determinants of the performance, and that other factors are likely responsible for 
observed outcomes. We extend that study with the claim that globalization induces peace and 
stability, which affects governance, and hence the performance of KE. Such a claim is not without 
theoretical standing as it can be quantified as an augmented production function. Consequently, to 
derive estimates of the determinants of KE across countries, we start with a simple Solow (1957) 
function of conventional factors and forces of production (X) and the state of technology (A), i.e., 
 
   (1) 
 
where X is a vector of control variables including labor, human and physical capital. Next we let the state 
of technology evolves as   such that (1) becomes 
 
        (2) 
 
For Zit  including Stability and Governance, (2) can be expressed as  
    (3) 
Dividing both sides of (3) by some Xi and taking natural logs leads to the X-intensive form of (3) 
as: 
    (4) 
where  In the empirical part we set  and briefly 
provide the rationale. The remaining task is to implement (3), and it is to that we now turn. 
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4. Methodology and Data  
 
To operationalize the theoretical model above, first we outline the methodology we follow and the 
data we use. Table 1 provides variable definitions and data sources, while Tables 2 and 3 present 
summary statistics and a correlation matrix, respectively. 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables 
    
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
 
Panel A: Knowledge Economy   
 
Panel A1: Education 
    
Primary School Enrolment  PSE School enrolment, primary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Secondary School Enrolment  SSE School enrolment, secondary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Tertiary School Enrolment  TSE School enrolment, tertiary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Education in KE Educatex  First PC of PSE, SSE & TSE PCA 
    
Panel A2: Information & Infrastructure  
    
Internet  Users  Internet Internet users (per 100 people)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions  Mobile Mobile subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Telephone lines Tel Telephone lines (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Information & Communication 
Technology (ICT) in KE 
ICTex First PC of Internet, Mobile & Tel PCA 
    
Panel A3: Economic Incentives   
    
Financial Activity (Credit) Pcrbof Private domestic credit from banks and 
other financial institutions  
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Interest Rate Spreads IRS Lending rate minus deposit rate (%) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Incentives in KE Creditex  First PC of Pcrbof and IRS PCA 
    
Panel A4: Innovation  
    
Scientific & Technical Publications  STJA  Number of Scientific & Technical Journal 
Articles  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trademark Applications  Trademark  Total Trademark Applications World Bank (WDI) 
    
Patent Applications  Patent Total Residents + Nonresident Patent 
Applications  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Innovation in KE  Innovex First PC of STJA, Trademarks and Patents  PCA 
    
    
Panel B: Governance  
    
Panel B1: Economic Governance  
    
 
Government Effectiveness 
 
GE 
Government effectiveness (estimate): 
measures the quality of public services, the 
quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the 
quality of policy formulation and 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
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implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such 
policies.  
    
Regulation Quality  RQ Regulation quality (estimate): measured as 
the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Governance  EG First Principal Component of Government 
Effectiveness and Regulation Quality. The 
capacity of government to formulate & 
implement policies, and to deliver 
services.  
              PCA 
    
    
Panel B2: Institutional Governance  
    
Rule of Law RL Rule of law (estimate): captures 
perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Corruption Control CC Control of corruption (estimate): captures 
perceptions of the extent to which 
publicpower is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state 
by elites and private interests.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional Governance IG First Principal Component of Rule of Law 
and Corruption-Control. The respect for 
citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
    
Panel B3: General Governance  
    
General Governance   GG First principal component of Political 
Stability, Voice & Accountability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulation 
Quality, Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control.  
PCA 
    
Panel C: Globalization  
Trade Openness  Trade Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial Openness  FDI Gross Foreign Direct Investment (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Globalization  Global Trade Openness + Financial Openness  Employed 
interactively during 
regressions  
    
Panel D: Political Stability/No Violence (Dependent variable) 
    
Political Stability  PolSta Political stability/no violence (estimate):  
16 
 
measured as the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional and violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism.  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Panel E: Control Variables  
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government Expenditure  Gov. Exp. Government’s Final Consumption 
Expenditure (% of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg Gross Domestic Product (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
ICT Service Exports  ICTexp ICT Service Exports (% of service exports, 
BoP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Liquid Liabilities  Fdgdp Financial System Deposits (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial System Efficiency  FcFd Financial System Credit on Financial 
System Deposits  
World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PC: Principal Component. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. Educatex is 
the first principal component of primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolments. ICTex: first principal component of mobile, telephone and internet 
subscriptions. Creditex: First PC of Private domestic credit and interest rate spread. PC: Principal Component. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. 
GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption.  BoP: Balance of Payments.  
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
      
Education (Educatex) -0.075 1.329 -2.116 5.562 320 
Information & Communication Technology  (ICTex) 0.008 1.480 -1.018 8.475 765 
Economic Incentives (Creditex) -0.083 0.893 -4.889 2.041 383 
Innovation (Innovex) 1.021 2.542 -0.770 8.859 102 
Economic Governance (EG)  0.042 1.310 -3.276 3.376 598 
Institutional Governance (IG)  -0.006 1.367 -4.196 3.310 622 
General Governance (G.G)  0.105 2.075 -5.399 5.233 598 
Political Stability/ No Violence  -0.557 0.958 -3.311 1.143 636 
Trade Openness  77.853 39.698 17.859 275.23 719 
Financial Openness (FDI) 4.221 8.451 -8.629 145.20 557 
Inflation  57.556 955.55 -100.00 24411 673 
Government Expenditure  4.392 12.908 -57.815 90.544 468 
GDP growth   4.763 7.293 -31.300 106.28 759 
ICT Service Exports  0.008 1.480 -1.018 8.475 765 
Liquid Liabilities  0.251 0.214 0.001 1.054 567 
Financial System Efficiency  0.755 0.423 0.137 2.606 567 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
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Table 3: Correlation Analysis  
                 
 Governance Globalization Control Variables Knowledge  Economy  
PolSta EG IG GG Trade FDI Inflation Gov.Exp GDPg ICTexp Fdgdp FcFd Educatex ICTex Creditex Innovex  
1.000 0.644 0.765 0.804 0.303 0.044 -0.061 0.011 0.046 -0.230 0.422 0.038 0.293 0.377 -0.305 0.284 PolSta 
 1.000 0.875 0.943 0.071 -0.100 -0.113 0.038 0.057 -0.318 0.583 0.321 0.463 0.405 -0.643 0.679 EcoGov 
  1.000 0.957 0.173 0.007 -0.090 0.069 -0.013 -0.287 0.669 0.189 0.462 0.443 -0.579 0.505 InstGov 
   1.000 0.148 -0.034 -0.099 0.048 0.033 -0.270 0.608 0.239 0.435 0.435 -0.606 0.574 G.Gov 
    1.000 0.452 0.022 -0.049 0.125 -0.106 0.250 -0.149 0.304 0.321 0.059 -0.078 Trade 
     1.000 0.011 0.125 0.197 -0.034 0.044 -0.154 0.042 0.145 0.119 -0.099 FDI 
      1.000 -0.139 -0.057 -0.088 -0.053 -0.076 -0.089 0.002 0.152 -0.226 Inflation 
       1.000 0.103 -0.032 -0.061 -0.009 0.035 -0.023 0.039 -0.037 Gov.Exp 
        1.000 -0.148 -0.101 -0.067 0.003 -0.048 0.132 -0.117 GDPg 
         1.000 -0.278 -0.056 -0.422 -0.149 0.137 -0.277 ICTexp 
          1.000 0.053 0.673 0.797 -0.675 0.508 Fdgdp 
           1.000 -0.038 0.069 -0.634 0.878 FcFd 
            1.000 0.697 -0.541 0.652 Educatex 
             1.000 -0.551 0.508 ICTex 
              1.000 -0.945 Creditex 
               1.000 Innovex 
                 
PolSta: Political Stability. EG: Economic Governance. IG: Institutional Governance. GG: General Governance. Trade: Trade Openness. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Gov. Exp: Government 
Expenditure. GDPg: GDP growth. ICTexp: ICT Service Exports. Fdgdp: Financial System Deposits (Liquid Liabilities). FcFd: Financial System Efficiency (Financial System Credit on 
Financial System Deposits). Educatex: Educational Index. ICTex: ICT index. Creditex: Economic Incentives. Innovex: Innovation Index.  
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4.1 Testable Hypotheses  
We use three main steps to substantiate the proposition that globalization induces peace and 
stability, which in turn affects governance, and hence the KE. The first-stage addresses 
globalization-induced peace & stability, where stability is defined as political stability/no 
violence, and is instrumented with globalization. The instrumentation process we propose 
produces three main outcomes: trade-induced stability, stability induced by financial openness,
6
  
and globalization-induced stability.  
   In the second-stage, governance is instrumented with globalization-induced stability 
obtained from first-stage regressions. Nine outcomes emerge from this exercise: economic 
governance as a function of trade-induced stability; economic governance as determined by 
stability that is induced by financial openness; economic governance as a function of 
globalization-induced stability; institutional governance driven by trade-induced stability; 
institutional governance as affected by stability based on financial openness; institutional 
governance as caused by globalization-induced stability; general governance as a function of 
trade-induced stability; general governance as influenced by stability resulting from financial 
openness,  and finally general governance as a function of globalization-induced stability. 
 The third-stage of the estimation process deals with the KE-governance relationship. The 
entire estimation process reduces to the following four testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Globalization induced stability affects governance which influences KE in terms of 
education.  
Hypothesis 2: Globalization induced stability affects governance which influences KE in terms of 
ICT .  
 
                                                          
6
 We have dropped de juré capital openness (KAOPEN) in preference for the de facto (Foreign direct investment) 
measurement because the former has a substantially lower standard deviation.  
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Hypothesis 3: Globalization induced stability affects governance which influences KE in terms of 
economic incentives.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Globalization induced stability affect governance which influences KE in terms of 
innovation.  
 
4.2 Principal Component Analysis  
A substantial body of recent literature documents constituent elements of the Knowledge 
Economy Index (KEI) components may be correlated with one another, see, eg., Asongu (2013a,b, 
2014b) and Andrés et al ( 2014). Thus we address the issues of degrees of substitution and 
mitigate concerns related to overparameterization (and multicollinearity). Therefore, we employ 
principal component analysis (PCA) to address concerns over information redundancy. PCA is a 
widely used statistical method that consists of reducing a set of highly correlated variables into a 
smaller set of uncorrelated indicators called principal components (PCs) that reflect a substantial 
portion of information in the initial dataset. After the process, we employ the Kaiser (1974) and 
Jolliffe (2002) criterion for the retention of common factors. They have recommended the 
retention of PCs with an eigenvalue that is greater than the mean or one. The retained eigenvalues 
reflect eigenvectors that denote a significant proportion of the initial information or total 
variability.  
4.2.1 Knowledge Economy Indicators  
Table 4 displays the first PCs: education (Educatex), information and communication technology 
(ICTex) innovation (Innovex) and economic incentives (Creditex). From the table we notice 
consistently that the corresponding eigenvalues are greater than one,  reflecting a significant 
amount of overall information retained: about 65%, 73%, 91% and 65% for education, ICTs, 
innovation and economic incentives, respectively.  
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Table 4: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Knowledge Economy Indicators 
Knowledge Economy 
dimensions 
Component Matrix (Loadings) First 
PC 
Eigen 
Value 
Indexes 
     
Education  School 
Enrolment  
PSE SSE TSE    
0.438 0.657 0.614 0.658 1.975 Educatex  
           
Information & 
Infrastructure 
ICTs  Internet Mobile Telephone    
0.614 0.584 0.531 0.730 2.190 ICTex 
           
Innovation 
System  
Innovation STJA Trademarks Patents     
0.567 0.572 0.592 0.917 2.753 Innovex 
           
Economic 
Incentive 
Economic 
Incentive  
Private Credit  Interest rate Spread    
-0.707 0.707 0.656 1.313  Creditex   
           
P.C: Principal Component. PSE: Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. TSE: Tertiary School Enrolment. PC: Principal 
Component. ICTs: Information and Communication Technologies. Educatex is the first principal component of primary, secondary and tertiary 
school enrolments. ICTex: first principal component of mobile, telephone and internet subscriptions. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal 
Articles. Innovex: first principal component of STJA, trademarks and patents (resident plus nonresident). Creditex: first principal component of 
private domestic credit and interest rate spread.  
 
4.2.2  Governance Indicators  
The need to minimize potential redundancy of information also applies to the governance 
indicators. Here we limit the concept of governance to the economic and institutional dimensions 
of governance only, because the political aspect of governance (political stability/no violence) is 
used already in the first-phase of the modeling process as apparent from the problem statement. 
First we obtain a general governance (GG) composite indicator, and then decompose it further 
into its economic (government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional (corruption-
control and rule of law) dynamics. Economic governance (EG) is defined as the ability of 
government to formulate and implement policies that are conducive to economic activity as well 
as delivery of needed commodities. Institutional governance (IG) denotes the respect for citizens 
and the state of institutions that govern the interactions among them as well between the people 
and their government (Andrés et al., 2014). The Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion 
discussed in the preceding section is used here as well for the retention of common factors. As 
shown in Table 5 below, GG has an eigenvalue of 3.438 and reflects approximately 85% of 
information in the four governance variables (regulation quality, government effectiveness, 
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corruption-control, rule of law); EG represents more than 90% of variability with  1.812 as 
eigenvalue;  and IG has a 1.871 eigenvalue representing about 93.5% of information. 
Table 5: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value   
 RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.G) 0.478 0.514 0.514 0.493 0.859 0.859 3.438 
Second  PC 0.786 -0.006 -0.149 -0.601 0.078 0.938 0.314 
Third PC 0.392 -0.567 -0.385 0.614 0.033 0.971 0.132 
        
First PC (EG) 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.906 0.906 1.812 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.093 1.000 0.187 
        
First PC (IG) --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.935 0.935 1.871 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.064 1.000 0.128 
        
PC: Principal Component. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. CC: Control of Corruption. GG (General 
Governance): First PC of  RQ, GE, RL & CC. EG (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. IG (Institutional Governance): First PC of RL & 
CC.  
 
4.3 Estimation Technique  
In light of our central claim that globalization induces peace and stability and thereby affects 
governance, which in turn affects KE, we adopt a three-stage step-wise empirical approach, 
utilizing an instrumental variable panel fixed effects estimation strategy. It is important to 
highlight that this strategy because it is consistent with our problem statement in that it requires 
the instruments to be strong, but not necessarily valid. In other words, we are more concerned with 
the strength of the instruments than we are with their validity for two main reasons. First, while 
the intuition underpinning the problem statement is strong, it has not yet been generalized into a 
theory. As far as we can deduces from the literature we reviewed, this is the first paper to critically 
engage such empirics – contrary to the common saying we admit the first cut may not be the 
deepest cut. Second, the problem statement by definition is not concerned about instrument 
validity. For instance, the first-stage that is concerned with globalization induced stability does not 
require us to prove that globalization is valid in inducing peace and stability, but that it is strong in 
doing so (inducing peace and stability). Hence, while the validity of globalization as an instrument 
for peace and stability may consolidate the intuition for the empirics, it is not an absolutely 
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necessary condition to validate the transition to stage-two of the estimation process. The strength 
of the instruments is confirmed by the overall validity of the specifications according the Fisher 
statistic.  
 The following are the three-stages of the estimation strategy: 
First-stage regression:  
 ititit FDITradeStability )()( 210  t it ,       (5) 
where Stability represents Political Stability/No violence, Trade is for trade openness, FDI is 
Foreign Direct Investment as represented by Financial Openness, and t  is a time-specific 
constant added to account for the fixed effects. 
                                                       
Second-stage regression:
 
ittitititit GlobStabFDIStabTradeStabGovernance   )()()( 3210    (6)    
where Governance entails general governance (GG), economic governance (EG), and institutional 
governance (IG), TradeStab stands for trade- induced political stability, FDISta represents 
political stability induced by financial openness, and GlobStab is globalization-induced political 
stability. 
 
Third-stage regression: 
  
ittitjititit
ititit
itititit
XGGGlobStabGGFDIStabbGGTradeSta
IGGlobStabIGFDIStabbIGTradeSta
EGGlobStabEGFDIStabbEGTradeStaKE






)()()(
)()()(
)()()(
987
654
3210
   (7) 
where KE is represented by education (Educatex), ICTs (ICTex), innovation (Innovex) and 
economic incentive (Creditex), and X is a vector of control variables that include government 
expenditure, economic growth, inflation, liquidity liabilities, financial system efficiency and ICT 
service exports. Note that it would seem (7) does not include the conventional factors of 
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production like labor and human and physical capital. However, these are implied by the 
“economic growth” variable.
 
Also note that vector or error terms, µit, in (1)-(4) is now explicated in (5)-(7) as it ,  and 
it   respectively. In a Solow (1957) production function framework  is a Hicks neutral 
Solow constant (residual) acting as a placeholder for exogenous technical change, and since 
 such that its rate of growth is . Our modest innovation is that KE is augmented 
by globalization-induced peace and stability and governance such that 
  In that case the rate of technical change is 
  
The first-stage of the estimation process entails regressing the proxies of political stability 
on the globalization indicators (separately & jointly) and then saving the fitted values for the 
second-stage regressions. Doing so, results in three main instrumented variables as detailed above, 
which are then employed in the second stage as instrumental variables.
 7
 In the second-stage, 
governance indicators are regressed on the fitted values from first-stage to obtain governance 
dynamics affected by globalization induced stability. Nine main variables are obtained after the 
second-stage regression
8
.The third-stage uses the fitted values from the second-stage to assess the 
hypotheses underpinning the study. In all stages, regressions are consistent with 
                                                          
7
 IVTradeStab: Trade Openness induced stability. IVFDIStab: Financial Openness induced stability.. IVGlobStab: 
Globalization induced stability.  
8
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). 
IVEGFDIStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). 
IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by Globalisation(Glob) induced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: 
Institutional governance (IG) affected Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional 
governance (IG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: Institutional 
governance (IG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). IVGGtTradeStab: General governance 
(GG) affected by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General governance (GG) affected 
by Financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) affected by 
Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). 
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Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors and time fixed effects. A 
correlation analysis is employed to assess the degree of substitution of the fitted values obtained 
from second-stage regressions to mitigate overparameterization and/or multicollinearity issues that 
could substantially bias the signs of estimated coefficients.  
We investigate a panel of 53 African countries with data from African Development 
indicators of the World Bank for the period 1996-2010, or roughly 795 observations. We limit the 
scope of the investigation to that period because the data for the political stability indicator is only 
available from 1996 onwards. Moreover, in the estimations we control for: inflation, government 
expenditure, per capita economic prosperity, ICT service exports, liquid liabilities and financial 
system efficiency. The choice of these control variables is consistent with Andrés et al. (2014). 
With the exception of inflation, we generally expect the control variables to drive KE. However, it 
is should be noted that the expected signs are neither predictable nor known a priori, because the 
KE dimensions have distinct characteristics. For instance, per capita economic growth may not 
have the same effect on education and innovation, and least not across all countries all the time. 
Moreover, the presence of substantial surplus liquidity issues documented in African financial 
literature (Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2014c) could change the expected sign of financial efficiency 
and liquid liabilities on economic incentives (credit availability). As shown in Panel E of Table 1 
above, the variables and their corresponding data are clearly labeled and expressed appropriately. 
For example, inflation is annual percentage; ratios bank deposits for financial efficiency are ratios; 
per capita economic prosperity is GDP growth rate adjusted for population growth;  exports are % 
of service exports from Balance of Payments (ICT service exports); and government expenditure 
and liquid liabilities are time-dynamics of current GDP.  
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5. Empirical Results  
  
Following below we present the estimation results by stage, and then discuss their implications for 
policy and further research before we conclude. 
5.1 First- and second-stage instrumentations  
Table 6 below is concerned with the first- and second-stage regressions. Panel A tackles the 
instrumentation process whereas Panel B provides a further test for the strength of the instruments. 
While the procedure for testing the strength of instruments could be limited to the information 
criterion in Panel A (Fisher statistic) as documented in Beck et al. (2003) and Andrés & Asongu 
(2013), we have gone a step further to provide evidence on the strength of instruments in Panel B, 
because of the specific character of the problem we are addressing. Contrary to the mainstream 
literature, the instrumentation process is not based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), because the 
instruments are neither strong nor valid using the OLS estimator. Therefore, we substitute the 
basic OLS for a robust panel fixed effects procedure that would generate results with appealing 
information criteria on the strength of the instruments (Adjusted R² and Fisher statistics). As 
discussed above, the globalization induced political stability fitted values are employed as 
instrumental variables in the second-stage regressions to obtain the dynamics  that determine 
governance.
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         Table 6: First and second-stage regressions (Instrumentation with panel HAC fixed effects).  
              
                                    Panel A: Instrumentation 
 
 
 First-stage regressions Second-stage regressions  
 Dependent variable:  Dependent variable: institutional and economic governance   
 Globalization-induced  Governance affected by Globalization induced conflicts  
 Political Stability/No violence Economic Governance Institutional Governance General Governance  
Constant -0.574*** -0.416*** -0.532** 0.542 1.495 -0.144 3.297 0.714 0.151 2.635 1.574 0.048 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.855) (0.271) (0.813) (0.372) (0.736) (0.840) (0.554) (0.433) (0.954) 
Trade  0.0004 ---- 0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0,822)  (0.537)          
FDI --- 0.001 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.840) (0.789)          
             
IVTradeStab --- --- --- 0.872 --- --- 5.909 --- --- 4.819 --- --- 
    (0.878)   (0.384)   (0.575)   
IVFDIStab --- --- --- --- 2.929 --- --- 0.956 --- --- 2.774 --- 
     (0.413)   (0.850)   (0.600)  
IVGlobStab --- --- --- --- --- -1.520 --- --- -0.476 --- --- -1.410 
      (0.346)   (0.791)   (0.528) 
             
Adjusted R² 0.809 0.807 0.812 0.894 0.910 0.909 0.899 0.915 0.914 0.910 0.928 0.927 
Fisher  48.292*** 41.82*** 40.28*** 92.74*** 97.45*** 90.95*** 98.29*** 104.0*** 97.43*** 111.5*** 124.6*** 115.6*** 
Obs 567 440 419 542 418 397 554 430 409 542 418 397 
Countries 51 45 45 50 44 44 51 45 45 50 45 44 
             
             
 Panel B: Testing the Strength of the instruments  
             
Constant 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Instrument  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.822) (0.840) (0.534) (0.878) (0.413) (0.346) (0.384) (0.850) (0.791) (0.575) (0.600) (0.528) 
             
Ajusted R² 0.809 0.807 0.812 0.894 0.910 0.909 0.899 0.915 0.914 0.910 0.928 0.927 
Fisher  48.292*** 41.82*** 41.28*** 92.74*** 97.45*** 90.95*** 98.29*** 104.0*** 97.43*** 111.5*** 124.6*** 115.6*** 
Obs 567 440 419 542 418 397 554 430 409 542 418 397 
Countries 51 45 45 50 44 44 51 45 45 50 45 44 
             
           IVTradeStab: Trade Openness induced stability. IVFDIStab: Financial Openness induced stability.. IVGlobStab: Globalization induced stability. *,**,***: significance levels  
           at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
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Table 7: Correlation matrix 
          
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
1.000 0.996 0.996 0.902 0.890 0.891 0.974 0.965 0.965 IVEGTradeStab (1) 
 1.000 0.999 0.915 0.906 0.904 0.977 0.974 0.974 IVEGFDIStab (2) 
  1.000 0.913 0.902 0.903 0.976 0.972 0.973 IVEGGlobStab (3) 
   1.000 0.995 0.995 0.975 0.980 0.979 IVIGTradeStab (4) 
    1.000 0.999 0.967 0.977 0.976 IVIGFDIStab (5) 
     1.000 0.967 0.977 0.977 IVIGGlobStab (6) 
      1.000 0.996 0.996 IVGGTradeStab(7) 
       1.000 0.999 IVGGFDIStab (8) 
        1.000 IVGGGlobStab (9) 
          
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVEGFDIStab: Economic 
governance (EG) affected by financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by 
Globalisation(Glob) induced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: Institutional governance (IG) affected Trade openness (Trade) induced stability 
(Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional governance (IG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: 
Institutional governance (IG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). IVGGtTradeStab: General governance (GG) affected 
by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General governance (GG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced 
stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). 
 
  
5.2 Third-stage instrumentation:Addressing multicollinearity and overparameterization 
 
Before engaging in the third-stage regressions to analyze the main hypotheses underpinning 
the study, it is relevant to examine multicollinearity and overparameterization issues in the 
fitted values from second-stage regressions that may influence the expected signs. As shown 
in Table 7 there is a substantial degree of substitution among fitted values obtained from the 
second-stage instrumentation processes. Hence, the third-stage specifications would employ 
the instrumented values independently across specifications.    
 
5.3 Third-state regressions: Investigating the four hypotheses 
 
The results for the KE Hypothesis 1 that globalization-induced stability affects governance 
which influences KE in terms of education are reported in Table 8 below. The hypothesis is 
consistently validated across specifications. The positive sign is consistent with both intuition 
and the predictions of economic theory. In increasing order of relevance and significance the 
effects (3.94) of trade-induced stability on institutional governance are weakest, whereas 
trade-induced stability has the strongest impacts (26.66) on economic governance. Other cases 
fall between the two extremes. These include: general governance from trade-induced 
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stability (4.828); economic governance from financial openness induced stability (8.400); 
general governance from financial-openness-induced stability (8.870); and institutional 
governance from financial-openness-induced stability (25.71). 
 
Table 8: Effects on Education (Educatex) with panel HAC panel fixed effects  
          
 Dependent variable: Educatex (Third-Stage Regressions) 
          
Constant -21.05* -7.889** -1.449 -2.615 -23.56** 2.374 -4.962* -11.63** 3.302 
 (0.072) (0.030) (0.000) (0.104) (0.026) (0.272) (0.087) (0.028) (0.298) 
IVEGTradeStab 26.66* --- ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.068) 8.400**        
IVEGFDIStab  --- (0.024) ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
          
IVEGGloStab  --- --- 0.737 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.406)       
IVIGTradeStab  --- --- --- 3.937* --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.068)      
IVIGFDIStab   --- --- --- --- 25.71** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.024)     
IVIGGlobStab  --- --- --- --- --- -1.956 --- --- --- 
      (0.361)    
IVGGTradeStab  --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.828* --- --- 
       (0.068)   
IVGGFDIStab  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 8.870** --- 
        (0.024)  
IVGGGlobStab   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.109 
         (0.361) 
Inflation 0.005 0.004 0.005** 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (0.671) (0.357) (0.013) (0.671) (0.357) (0.465) (0.671) (0.357) (0.465) 
Gov. Expenditure  0.006** 0.003 -0.002 0.006** 0.003 0.002 0.006** 0.003 0.002 
 (0.028) (0.303) (0.152) (0.028) (0.303) (0.413) (0.028) (0.303) (0.413) 
GDP pcg -0.009 -0.008 0.005 -0.009 -0.008 0.001 -0.009 -0.008 0.001 
 (0.232) (0.481) (0.506) (0.232) (0.481) (0.888) (0.232) (0.481) (0.888) 
          
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.936 0.946 0.985 0.936 0.946 0.944 0.936 0.946 0.944 
Fisher  58.21*** 63.71*** 200.57*** 58.21*** 63.71*** 60.87*** 58.21*** 63.71*** 60.87*** 
Countries  31 28 28 31 28 28 31 28 28 
Observations  149 125 125 149 125 125 149 125 125 
          
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVEGFDIStab: Economic 
governance (EG) affected by financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by 
Globalisation(Glob) induced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: Institutional governance (IG) affected Trade openness (Trade) induced stability 
(Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional governance (IG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: 
Institutional governance (IG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). IVGGtTradeStab: General governance (GG) affected 
by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General governance (GG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced 
stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). Gov. Government. 
GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. *, **, ***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent.  
 
 KE Hypothesis 2 in Table 9 holds that globalization-induced stability affects 
governance, which influences KE in terms of ICT. The estimates that are significant have the 
expected signs and are consistent with both commonsense and theoretical predictions. In this 
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case the effects on institutional governance of the stability resulting from financial openness 
are strongest and positive (78.64) but they are lowest at 25.68 with respect economic 
governance. The impact on GG from the stability induced by financial openness falls in-
between (27.12) the two.  
 
Table 9: Effects on ICT (ICTex) with panel HAC panel fixed effects 
          
 Dependent variable: ICTex (Third-Stage Regressions) 
          
Constant -40.98 -24.28*** 7.313 -4.573 -61.02*** 18.318 -9.203 -32.98*** 9.940 
 (0.202) (0.007) (0.103) (0.241) (0.006) (0.117) (0.219) (0.006) (0.109) 
IVEGTradeStab  46.329 --- ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.198)         
IVEGFDIStab   --- 25.68*** ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.006)        
IVEGGloStab  --- --- -7.174 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.127)       
IVIGTradeStab  --- --- --- 6.842 --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.198)      
IVIGFDIStab   --- --- --- --- 78.64*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000)     
IVIGGloStab  --- --- --- --- --- -22.89 --- --- --- 
      (0.127)    
IVGGTradeStab  --- --- --- --- --- --- 8.390 --- --- 
       (0.198)   
IGGFDIStab   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 27.12*** --- 
        (0.000)  
IVGGGloStab   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -7.732 
         (0.127) 
Inflation 0.011 0.022 0.025 0.011 0.022 0.025 0.011 0.022 0.025 
 (0.465) (0.113) (0.116) (0.465) (0.113) (0.116) (0.465) (0.113) (0.116) 
Gov. Expenditure  0.002 0.006** 0.010** 0.002 0.006** 0.010** 0.002 0.006** 0.010** 
 (0.636) (0.044) (0.039) (0.636) (0.044) (0.039) (0.636) (0.044) (0.039) 
GDP pcg -0.051*** -0.077*** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.077*** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.077*** -0.058*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ICTservicesexport 0.102*** 0.100** 0.085** 0.102*** 0.100** 0.085** 0.102*** 0.100** 0.085** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.025) (0.000) (0.010) (0.025) (0.006) (0.010) (0.025) 
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.777 0.817 0.809 0.777 0.817 0.809 0.777 0.817 0.809 
Fisher  20.95*** 25.21*** 23.94*** 20.95*** 25.21*** 23.94*** 20.95*** 25.21*** 23.94*** 
Countries  28 27 27 28 27 27 28 27 27 
Observations  201 185 185 201 185 185 201 185 185 
          
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVEGFDIStab: Economic 
governance (EG) affected by financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by 
Globalisation(Glob) induced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: Institutional governance (IG) affected Trade openness (Trade) induced stability 
(Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional governance (IG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: 
Institutional governance (IG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). IVGGtTradeStab: General governance (GG) affected 
by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General governance (GG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced 
stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). Gov. Government. 
GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. *,**,***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent.  
 
 Hypothesis 3, presented in Table 10, states that globalization-induced stability affects 
governance, which influences KE in terms of economic incentives. The significant estimates 
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have mixed signs -- both negative and positive. While there are negative effects from FDI 
related estimates, the impacts are positive for globalization oriented estimates.  
 The positive values related to globalization induced stability are highest in regard to 
IG (2.33) and lowest with respect to EG (0.731), with GG falling in-between (0.788). In 
absolute terms, on the other hand, the negative effects of FDI-related estimates are highest in 
IG (-5.51) and lowest in economic governance (-1.80). GG from FDI-induced stability is in-
between (-1.90). The negative effect of FDI could be explained by the fact that, contrary to 
trade-related activities, FDI itself is weakly associated with the issues of surplus liquidity in 
African financial institutions. Trade is a mutual exchange of comparative advantages; FDI 
flows easily when the risk-free rate of return is higher in the destination location (country) 
than it is in the home (source) country. In other words, while trading activities are most likely 
to involve borrowing from domestic banks mainly, because domestic economic operators are 
actively engaged, FDI activities involve foreign banks as main financial players. In this sense 
FDI should have limited positive impact on peace and stability, and could have a negative 
effect if it is driven by politics – a good example for Alesina and coauthors’ (2000) case that 
while trade integrates, politics disintegrates. 
Table 10: Effects on Economic incentives (Creditex) with panel HAC panel fixed effects 
          
 Dependent variable: Creditex (Third-Stage Regressions) 
          
Constant 3.894* 3.030*** 0.483 1.505*** 6.308*** -0.939 1.809*** 3.813*** 0.142 
 (0.092) (0.000) (0.298) (0.001) (0.000) (0.439) (0.007) (0.000) (0.819) 
IVEGTradeStab  -3.562 --- ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.218)         
IVEGFDIStab  --- -1.802** ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.017)        
IVEGGloStab  --- --- 0.731* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.089)       
IVIGTradeStab --- --- --- -0.526 --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.218)      
IVIGFDIStab   --- --- --- --- -5.517** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.017)     
IVIGGloStab  --- --- --- --- --- 2.334* --- --- --- 
      (0.089)    
IVGGTradeStab  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.645 --- --- 
       (0.218)   
IVGGFDIStab  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -1.903** --- 
        (0.017)  
IVGGGloStab  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.788* 
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         (0.089) 
Inflation -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 (0.591) (0.831) (0.847) (0.591) (0.831) (0.847) (0.591) (0.831) (0.847) 
Gov. Expenditure  0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.174) (0.902) (0.870) (0.174) (0.902) (0.870) (0.174) (0.902) (0.870) 
GDPpcg 0.0008 0.002 0.001 0.0008 0.002 0.001 0.0008 0.002 0.001 
 (0.662) (0.457) (0.705) (0.662) (0.457) (0.705) (0.662) (0.457) (0.705) 
Liquid liabilities  -1.731*** -1.944*** -1.956*** -1.731*** -1.944*** -1.956*** -1.731*** -1.944*** -1.956*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial efficiency  -1.158*** -1.236*** -1.267*** -1.158*** -1.236*** -1.267*** -1.158*** -1.236*** -1.267*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.975 0.980 0.980 0.975 0.980 0.980 0.975 0.980 0.980 
Fisher  261.09*** 306.20*** 304.37*** 261.09*** 306.20*** 304.37*** 261.09*** 306.20*** 304.37*** 
Countries  24 20 20 24 20 20 24 20 20 
Observations  211 172 172 211 172 172 211 172 172 
          
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVEGFDIStab: Economic 
governance (EG) affected by financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by 
Globalisation(Glob) induced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: Institutional governance (IG) affected Trade openness (Trade) induced stability 
(Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional governance (IG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: 
Institutional governance (IG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). IVGGtTradeStab: General governance (GG) affected 
by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General governance (GG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced 
stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab).  Gov. Government. 
GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. *,**,***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent.  
 
 The fourth, and final, KE hypothesis states that globalization-induced stability affects 
governance, which influences KE in terms of innovation (Table 11). Here the effects range 
from the low of -14.26 to the high of 23.95. While trade-related effects are positive, 
globalization-oriented estimates are negative. The positive impacts for EG are highest at 
23.95, followed by GG at 4.33, and last by IG at 3.53. With regard to the negative effects, 
globalization-induced peace stability the largest negative effect (-14.26) on IG. EG responds 
least (-4.47) negatively to globalization-induced peace and stability, whereas similar effect of 
-4.82 on GG lie in-between. The logical inference is that, relative to FDI, trade-associated 
peace and stability has a weight on the KE as represented by innovation (Innovex). In other 
words, as globalization trade openness is a more effective mechanism for the innovation 
aspect of KE than FDI.   
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Table 11: Effects on Innovation (Innovex) with panel HAC panel fixed effects 
          
 Dependent variable: Innovex (Third-Stage Regressions) 
          
Constant -17.197* -2.687 4.258** -1.785 -5.721 9.251* -3.745* -3.400 5.449* 
 (0.071) (0.773) (0.048) (0.101) (0.782) (0.062) (0.075) (0.777) (0.053) 
IVEGTradeStab  23.948* --- ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.072)         
IVEGFDIStab --- 2.934 ---- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.790)        
IVEGGloStab  --- --- -4.471* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.078)       
IVIGTradeStab  --- --- --- 3.536* --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.072)      
IVIGFDIStab  --- --- --- --- 8.980 --- --- --- --- 
     (0.790)     
IVIGGloStab  --- --- --- --- --- -14.26* --- --- --- 
      (0.078)    
IVGGTradeStab  --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.336* --- --- 
       (0.072)   
IVGGFDIStab  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.098 --- 
        (0.790)  
IVGGGloStab  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -4.819* 
         (0.078) 
Inflation 0.006 0.015** 0.010 0.006 0.015** 0.010 0.006 0.015** 0.010 
 (0.288) (0.029) (0.239) (0.288) (0.029) (0.239) (0.288) (0.029) (0.239) 
Gov. Expenditure  0.001 0.006* 0.004* 0.001 0.006* 0.004* 0.001 0.006* 0.004* 
 (0.153) (0.055) (0.066) (0.153) (0.055) (0.066) (0.153) (0.055) (0.066) 
GDP pcg 0.003 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.016 0.008 
 (0.698) (0.321) (0.425) (0.698) (0.321) (0.425) (0.698) (0.321) (0.425) 
Liquid Liabilities 2.411* 2.943 2.548* 2.411* 2.943 2.548* 2.411* 2.943 2.548* 
 (0.080) (0.130) (0.086) (0.080) (0.130) (0.086) (0.080) (0.130) (0.086) 
          
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.976 0.974 0.974 0.976 0.974 0.974 0.976 0.974 0.974 
Fisher  164.98*** 134.93*** 139.05*** 164.98*** 134.93*** 139.05*** 164.98*** 134.93*** 139.05*** 
Countries  13 11 11 13 11 11 13 11 11 
Observations  81 65 65 81 65 65 81 65 65 
          
IVEGTradeStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVEGFDIStab: Economic 
governance (EG) affected by financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVEGGlobStab: Economic governance (EG) affected by 
Globalisation(Glob) induced stability(Stab). IVIGTradeStab: Institutional governance (IG) affected Trade openness (Trade) induced stability 
(Stab).  IVIGFDIStab: Institutional governance (IG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced stability (Stab). IVIGGlobStab: 
Institutional governance (IG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). IVGGtTradeStab: General governance (GG) affected 
by Trade openness (Trade) induced stability (Stab). IVGGFDIStab: General governance (GG) affected by Financial openness (FDI) induced 
stability (Stab). IVGGGlobStab: General governance (GG) affected by Globalization (Glob) induced stability (Stab). Gov. Government. 
GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. *,**,***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent.  
 
 Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. First, government 
expenditure improves education. Second, ICT services and government expenditure have a 
positive incidence on ICT. Third, the negative relationship between the financial indicators 
and economic incentives confirm the predictions of economic theory as documented by the 
literature on the surplus liquidity issues in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006).  
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5.4 Further discussion, policy implications and future research directions 
 
Unlike previous studies which found globalization and governance to either have negative or 
positive effects on KE, ours show that globalization-induced peace and stability can have 
positive and negative effects on governance and KE in African countries at the same time, 
depending on how both globalization and governance are defined. In addition the effects are 
of varying strengths. One may interpret such findings as meaning that the ambitions for KE of 
these countries are dim, but also realistic and achievable as long as the countries continue to 
engage in the kind of globalization that enhances peace and stability and hence governance. 
The results are particularly encouraging because the positive impacts outweigh the negative 
ones, so that the multi-polar nature of both is consistent with the ongoing debates on 
globalization in general (Henry, 2007; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009).   
 Given that the motivation of this paper is to extend Andrés’s et al. (2014) conclusion 
that formal institutions of governance has affected negatively KE in 22 SSA and MENA 
countries, the use of additional instrumental variables of globalization, and peace and stability 
has revealed opposite effects. The new findings confirm the conclusion of the previous study 
that governance is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for KE in these countries during 
the study time period. However, the current results shed additional light on previous 
conclusions as they depend on whether or not globalization induces the peace and stability 
underlying governance. A major policy implication is that for African KEs to benefit 
substantially from globalization, the latter must improve the kind of ‘peace & political 
stability’ needed to initiate the positive role of governance in KE. The implication raises some 
concern because, relative to other world regions, Africa has had low levels of political 
stability (Asongu, 2014d). First, in North Africa, for example, the Arab Spring of 2011 is not 
yet completely over, besides the fact that it remains debatable whether or not it has created 
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conditions favorably to peace and stability even in the long term. Such outcome is primarily 
because the manner in which democracy (another requirement for peace and stability) is 
conceived and defined has been modified in Egypt on several occasions in the last two years 
alone. The political transition in Tunisia is failing to honour the terms of its social contract 
because of increasing political assassinations and social disruptions. Without a social contract 
the provision of public goods and services, including peace and stability, remains inefficient. 
In Libya, the law of the land since the ouster of Gaddafi is still, to a great extent, determined 
by the rebels who have neither joined the central government nor accepted to disarm – a very 
good example of rebels without a meaningful social cause. Second, in SSA the situation in 
South Sudan, which has just marked the third independence anniversary, remains a serious 
challenge to the international community, thereby clogging performance channels from 
globalization to peace-stability to governance and to KE. Third, the outlook is equally unclear 
for the Central African Republic and other areas, which have continued to be fertile grounds 
for political conflicts and violence over the last two decades, or longer. These conflicts have 
worked against effective governance thereby affecting KE by preventing globalization-
induced peace and stability. More emphatically, the situation for African countries is 
particularly serious because out of the nine cases of complete societal breakdown known to 
recent history, seven have been witnessed on the continent: Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Zaire/Congo and Angola. The exceptions are Afghanistan and Syria.
9
 
                                                          
9
 Instability has dominated the African political landscape for nearly five decades. More recently a few conflicts 
that have impeded progress in the region include inter alia, a series of aborted coup d’états between 1996-2003, 
the 2004-2007 Bush war, and the 2012 to present ‘Séléka/Anti-balaka’ conflicts in the CAR; the 2007/2008 post-
election crises in Kenya, politico-economic strife in Zimbabwe and increasing determination of the Boko Haram 
to destabilize Nigeria; Burundi (1993-2005); Sierra Leone (1991-2002); Angola (1975-2002); Chad (2005-
2010); Liberia (1999-2003); the Darfur crisis of Sudan; waves of conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo; 
Côte d’Ivoire with a 2002-2007 civil war followed political crisis in 2011 and; Somalia where the Al-Shabab 
militant group has just been defeated after over 20 decades of civil war.  
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We make one thing clear. Our stance in this paper, as in all our other work on this 
topic, is not about whether or not there is a predisposition for violence and instability in 
African countries. Very far from it! Our concern is that having instability where institutions 
for governance are exogenous and deficient is a considerable challenge for the growth of KE. 
The stylized facts above have shown that Africa’s goal of building KEs is seriously being 
hampered by political violence and instability. Hence, in order to reverse the trend of the 
continent’s low overall index of KE, which fell between 2000 and 2009 according to 
Anyanwu (2012), it is essential for policy to focus on improving conditions for peace & 
stability.  
On the lighter side of things, there are fruitful pathways which African countries can 
exploit. For one, the negative effects of FDI estimates on economic incentives coupled with 
the positive weight of trade openness as a proxy for globalization on innovations are 
appealing as one KE pathway in these countries. This result is consistent with the surplus 
liquidity issues in African financial institutions documented by Saxegaard (2006). Hence, the 
negative effect on governance of FDI-induced stability is not unexpected, because FDI 
activities mainly involve foreign operators and financial institutions, often working hand-in-
hand with local political elites – the ‘capture state’ phenomenon. Trade activities generally 
involve domestic financial institutions and economic operators. It follows easily then that FDI 
entails less domestic financial intermediation than trade openness. Second, trade openness is 
potentially a more appealing mechanism for innovation than FDI because it is more inclusive 
and less restrictive than the latter which is mostly both resource- and technology-intensive. 
Finally, the results suggest a number of interesting future research directions, among 
them the following three. First, it would be interesting to use alternative measurements of 
globalization and peace & stability to test (confirm or disconfirm) the current hypotheses. The 
model in this paper assumed away all bi-directional causations. A second line for research 
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would be to explore deeper the linkages running from KE to globalization instead of the other 
way around. This may include a reverse exposition of globalization-induced conflicts or 
conflict-induced globalization as starting points. A third promising vein for mining is to 
integrate this current research into the opportunities opened up by the work of Hsiang, et. al. 
(2011, 2013) on climate-induced conflicts and to link both to globalization, governance and 
KE in developing countries.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The research which this paper extends found relatively weak or negative impacts on KE of 
formal institutions of governance, and it concluded that formal institutions are necessary, but 
inadequate, determinants of KE in SSA and MENA countries. It suggested that other factors 
probably drive KE in this group of countries, and issued a call for further investigations into 
the issues. This study is a response to that call. 
 One key limitation of the previous research is that it did not consider the effects on KE 
of globalization either directly or indirectly through governance. In this paper we claim that 
globalization induces peace and stability, and the latter influence governance, which then 
affects KE. We model the claim as a three-stage process in four testable hypotheses, and 
estimate each hypothesis using robust estimators, which are capable of dealing with the usual 
statistical problems without sacrificing economic relevance and significance. The empirical 
evidence generated by the estimations show clearly that globalization has varying effects on 
peace and stability, and that the latter affects governance differently depending on what kind 
of globalization induces it. The analysis has many potential implications for both policy and 
research as discussed in the preceding section above. 
 A number of conclusions jump out from the analysis, including the following three. 
One, because the effects on governance induced by globalization defined as trade are stronger 
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than those resulting from globalization taken to be FDI, we conclude that FDI is not a 
powerful mechanism for stimulating and sustaining KE in this group of countries. Two, since 
globalization-induced peace and stability have both positive and negative effects on 
governance simultaneously, we conclude that the prospect for KE in African countries is dim, 
but still realistic as long as these countries continue to engage in the kind of globalization that 
does indeed induce peace and stability. 
 Improving peace and stability independent of globalization is another way to KE, but 
it is currently difficult, given weak or absence of institutions and ongoing conflicts. However, 
in situations where such conflicts are due to the distribution of either resources or the outputs 
resources produce, we conclude that there is a need for a sharp focus on economic and 
institutional governance than on general governance, which conventional economic theory has 
overemphasized. This suggests many possible extensions of this study. One would examine 
the effects of climate-induced conflicts on globalization-induced peace and stability, and the 
impacts of the latter on KE via governance. However, whereas we feel confident about the 
directions for future research, we caution against careless interpretation of this study for 
policy purposes.  
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